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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell
I. INTRODUCTION

The most significant news during the current survey year continued
to be the major legislative developments discussed in last year's survey.'
Most significantly, the Georgia General Assembly, during its 2005
session, enacted Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section
24-9-67.1,2 which purports to adopt, more or less, the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,

Inc.3 and its progeny, and creates special rules for expert testimony in
medical negligence actions. In other words, Daubert has now come to
Georgia and, as discussed below, there were both legislative and judicial
developments regarding Georgia's new expert witness rule during the
survery period.
As also discussed in last year's survey,4 the State Bar of Georgia has
proposed that the General Assembly adopt, with some exceptions and
variations, the Federal rules of Evidence. The current version of the
proposed Rules can be found at the State Bar's website.5 However,
there was no legislative action on the Rules during the 2006 sesssion of
the General Assembly.

* Partner in the firm of Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., cum
laude, 1981). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187 (2006). Although Georgia
may be inching towards the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Georgia still does
not have a comprehensive evidence code. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 44
MERCER L. REV. 214 (1992). This Article, however, will continue in the tradition of past
Georgia Survey articles and will follow the organizational format of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
2. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2006).
3. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187 (2005).
5. www.gabar.org/news/report-oftheevidence-studycommittee (June 6, 2005).
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OBJECTIONS

Georgia's contemporaneous objection rule requires a party to timely
object to the introduction of evidence; the failure to do so precludes a
party from raising the issue on appeal.' The court of appeals decision
in Telcom Cost Consulting, Inc. v.Warren7 provides an excellent primer
on the contemporaneous objection rule and how the rule interacts with
motions in limine and continuing objections. In Telcom the plaintiffs
argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to
testify about prior consistent out-of-court statements made by another
witness. The defendants responded that the plaintiffs had waived their
right to appeal that issue because they had not moved in limine to
preclude the testimony and they did not object each time the witness
testified about the prior consistent statements.' When the defendants
first asked the witness whether she had discussed the transaction with
the declarant, the plaintiffs objected on the grounds that the question
called for hearsay.9 In response to that specific objection, the trial court
ruled that the declarant's veracity had been attacked, and thus his prior
consistent statements to the witness would be admissible.'0 Thereafter,
the plaintiffs raised no further objections.
In response to the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs had waived
their right to appeal the admission of the prior consistent statements,
the plaintiffs argued that their initial objection and the trial court's
ruling on that objection was the "'functional equivalent of a motion in
limine denied,"' and thus there was no further need for them to
object." The court of appeals first noted that a motion in limine can
be used in two ways. 12 First, an attorney can ask the court to prohibit
any mention of the disputed evidence in the presence of the jury until
the admissibility of the evidence has been determined. 3 Second, an
attorney can seek a final ruling on the admissibility of evidence prior to

6. For a discussion of the contemporaneous objection rule in various situations, see
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 188-89 (2005); Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 56 MERCER L. REV. 235, 237-39 (2004); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 54 MERCER
L. REV. 309, 309-11 (2002); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 52 MERCER L. REV. 263, 263-65
(2000).
7. 275 Ga. App. 830, 621 S.E.2d 864 (2006).
8. Id. at 831, 621 S.E.2d at 866.
9. Id. at 832, 621 S.E.2d at 866.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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the trial. 4 Because the plaintiffs first raised the issue by way of an
objection during the trial, the court easily concluded that the plaintiffs
had not moved in limine, and thus, their objection and the ruling on that
objection did not relieve them of their obligation to continue to object to
inadmissible evidence. 5 The court did not elaborate on the plaintiffs'
point, but some discussion is appropriate. Generally speaking, if a party
has made a proper motion in limine and the court has ruled on that
motion, it is not necessary for the party to object to that evidence when
it is tendered at trial.'6 However, one should exercise caution when
relying on motions in limine to preserve an issue for an appeal. For
example, a ruling on a motion in limine may be correct at the time of the
ruling, but when the issue arises again at trial-that is, when the
evidence is tendered-the record may contain additional facts relevant
to the issue. The safer course, it would seem, would be for a party to
renew his objection when the disputed evidence is offered at trial to be
sure that he has preserved his right to appeal the issue.
Because the plaintiffs in Telcom had not moved in limine to seek a
final ruling on the admissibility of the evidence in question, they were
not relieved of their obligation to object to that evidence when it was
tendered. 7 Moreover, when the trial court ruled on the plaintiffs' only
objection, it made clear that it was ruling only on the specific question
pending at the time. This ruling put the plaintiffs on notice that if the
plaintiffs objected to further evidence, an additional objection would be
required. Furthermore, the plaintiffs did not raise a proper continuing
objection.18 To have a continuing objection to a line of questioning that
would relieve a party from repeatedly objecting, the record must
establish that the trial court has granted the party a right to a
continuing objection and that the court's ruling covers subsequent
questions.
III.

JuDicIAL NOTICE

The court of appeals decision in Ponce v. State9 illustrates a problem
often encountered by lawyers asking a court to take judicial notice of
state regulations. In its first time hearing Ponce, the court of appeals
reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground that the trial court

14.
15.

Id.
Id., 621 S.E.2d at 867.

16.

Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 55 MERCER L. REV. 249, 250 (2003); Marc T.

Treadwell, Evidence, 51 MERCER L. REV. 1165, 1165-66 (2000).

17.
18.
19.

275 Ga. App. at 832, 621 S.E.2d at 867.
Id., 621 S.E.2d at 866.
279 Ga. App. 207, 630 S.E.2d 840 (2006).
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should have suppressed evidence obtained from a warrantless search of
the defendant's commercial truck.2 ° The supreme court vacated that
decision and instructed the court of appeals to consider whether
regulations promulgated by the Public Service Commission ("PSC")
authorized the search of the defendant's truck.2 On remand to the
court of appeals, the State argued that two PSC rules authorized law
enforcement officers to inspect a commercial vehicle without a warrant
or a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 22 The court of appeals,
however, held that it could not take judicial notice of these regulations
because there was no evidence that the rules had been adopted in
compliance with and pursuant to Georgia's Administrative Procedures
Act ("the Act").23 Pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 50-13-8, 24 a court can
take judicial notice of state rules and regulations only if they were
adopted in compliance with the Act. 25 The court's opinion discusses in
some detail the court's search of both the secretary of state and PSC
websites and its inability to find any indication that the PSC's rules had
been adopted in accordance with the requirements of the Act.26
Because there was no admissible evidence of the PSC rules, and because
the court could not take judicial notice of the copies of the rules
submitted by the prosecution, the court of appeals again reversed the
defendant's conviction.
IV.

RELEVANCY

Since the Author began surveying evidence decisions for the Georgia
survey in 1988, the most frequently encountered relevancy issue has
been whether extrinsic act evidence is relevant. "Extrinsic act evidence"
refers to evidence of conduct on occasions other than the occasion at
issue that is offered as substantive, as opposed to impeachment,
evidence. 2' Generally, extrinsic act evidence is irrelevant and thus
inadmissible.2 ' Nevertheless, like the rule against hearsay, the rule
against extrinsic act evidence is known more for its exceptions than its
flat prohibition. Most commonly, evidence of completely separate but

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Ponce v. State, 271 Ga. App. 408, 415, 609 S.E.2d 736, 741 (2005).
Ponce v. State, 279 Ga. 651, 651, 619 S.E.2d 682, 682-83 (2005).
Ponce, 279 Ga. App. at 208, 630 S.E.2d at 842.
Id.; see generally O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-1 to -23 (2006).
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-8 (2006).
Id.
Ponce, 279 Ga. App. at 209-10, 630 S.E.2d at 843.
Id. at 210-11, 630 S.E.2d at 843-44.
See O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (1995); FED. R. EVID. 404.
Id.
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nonetheless similar transactions "'may be introduced to prove identity,
motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and course of conduct.' 3 0 Criminal
defense lawyers from scarcely more than a generation ago would hardly
recognize-and likely would be appalled at-the state of today's law of
evidence, particularly as it relates to similar transaction evidence. The
judiciary, on the other hand, does "'not concede, as suggested by some,
that the exceptions have swallowed the rule of inadmissibility of
separate crimes.''
That may be true, but concern that the floodgate
has been opened to similar transaction evidence has led Georgia's
appellate courts to use this precise quote on at least five occasions to
douse any such suspicions.
As the admission of similar transaction evidence becomes more
routine, it seems that prosecutors sometimes tend to grow lax in
satisfying the prerequisites to the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence.
This certainly seemed to be the case in Naillon v. State.32 In Naillon
the defendant contended that the trial court erroneously admitted
evidence that he had pleaded guilty to motor vehicle theft during his
trial for theft by receiving stolen property, giving false information to an
officer, and misrepresenting the identity of a vehicle by improperly
transferring a license plate. To prove the prior conviction, the State
called an employee of the Department of Corrections Probation Division
who authenticated the certified copy of the defendant's conviction;
however, the employee could provide no evidence about the facts or
circumstances surrounding the conviction. The defendant contended
that this evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite similarity
between the extrinsic offense and the charged offense. 33 The court of
appeals agreed.34 Specifically, the court held:
[E]vidence that the defendant committed a prior offense is generally
prejudicial, irrelevant, and inadmissible, even if the prior crime is of
the same type for which the defendant is being tried. However,
evidence of such prior crime may be admitted if "there is some logical
connection between the independent act and the crime for which the

30. Franklin v. State, 189 Ga. App. 405, 408, 376 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1988) (citing Sablon
v. State, 182 Ga. App. 128, 130, 355 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1987)).
31. Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 626, 458 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1995); accord State v.
Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 655, 272 S.E.2d 321, 322 (1980); Millwood v. State, 164 Ga. App.
699, 700, 296 S.E.2d 239, 240 (1982); Bissell v. State, 157 Ga. App. 711, 713, 278 S.E.2d
415, 417 (1981).
32. 276 Ga. App. 799, 625 S.E.2d 73 (2005).
33. Id. at 799-800, 625 S.E.2d at 74-75.
34. Id. at 800, 625 S.E.2d at 75.
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defendant is being tried, from which it can be said that proof of one
tends to establish the other."35
It is incumbent upon the State to offer evidence establishing that the
extrinsic offense and the charged offense are so similar that proof that
a defendant committed the prior offense tends to prove that he
committed the charged offense. 6 Simply tendering a certified copy of
the prior conviction does not satisfy the state's burden of proving
similarity.37 Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the defendant's
conviction.38
Extrinsic act evidence can also be relevant in civil cases, although,
perhaps ironically, courts seem more reluctant to admit extrinsic act
evidence in civil cases than in criminal cases. It would seem that in
criminal cases, when freedom and potentially life itself are at stake, the
courts would be more circumspect in the admission of prejudicial
extrinsic act evidence than in civil cases, which typically involve only
monetary damages. There is, however, a logical basis for this dichotomy.
Criminal cases typically concern intentional conduct, and therefore raise
issues such as motive, scheme, or identity. Thus, for example, proof that
a defendant intentionally committed a similar offense may tend to
identify him as the perpetrator of the charged offense. Civil cases, on
the other hand, typically concern issues of negligence or other unintentional acts. The fact that someone was negligent on a prior occasion
would prove nothing in a suit arising from a subsequent allegedly
negligent act, except perhaps that the defendant was prone to be
negligent, and propensity is not a permissible use of extrinsic act
evidence.
The issue, then, in civil cases as in criminal cases, is whether the
extrinsic act is relevant to some issue in the case. The application of the
rule against the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence in civil cases was
illustrated during the survey year by the court of appeals decision in
Colp v. Ford Motor Co.39 In Colp, a products liability action, the
plaintiffs contended that the details of thirty-seven crashes similar to
the crash involving the plaintiffs' Ford Aerostar were admissible in the
plaintiffs' product liability claim against Ford for injuries suffered in the
crash.
The plaintiffs contended that thirty of the incidents were
admissible to show that a defect in the latch on the side door of the
Aerostar could cause the door to accidentally open during a collision. In

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. (quoting Hudson v. State, 271 Ga. 477, 479, 521 S.E.2d 810, 812 (1999)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 801, 625 S.E.2d at 75.
279 Ga. App. 280, 630 S.E.2d 886 (2006).
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other words, those thirty incidents were tendered to prove that the latch
on the door of the plaintiffs' Aerostar failed as a result of a defective
design and that the thirty allegedly similar incidents demonstrated that
the design was defective. The remaining seven incidents involved claims
or complaints of accidental disengagement of latches, and the plaintiffs
contended that these seven incidents were relevant to prove Ford's notice
of the defective latch.4 °
In products liability actions such as Colp, Georgia courts apply the
"substantial similarity" test to determine the admissibility of other
incidents involving the product at issue. 41 To meet the substantial
similarity test, the party seeking to introduce the similar incidents must
show that the products involved (1) shared a common design; (2) suffered
from a common defect; and (3) that the defects arose from the same
causative factors.42 In Colp the trial court, after a two-day hearing,
concluded that the plaintiffs had not proved two of these three elements. 43 First, because twenty-eight of the thirty incidents involved a
different latch design, the plaintiffs had not proven that those incidents
involved a common design." Second, because the plaintiffs' collision
was a relatively low speed collision and the other incidents involved
higher speed collisions, the trial court concluded the plaintiffs had not
proven common causation. 45 The court of appeals granted the plaintiffs' application for interlocutory appeal and in a detailed opinion,
affirmed the trial court's order excluding evidence of the other incidents.46
Essentially, the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the trial court should have accepted testimony of the
plaintiffs' expert that the difference in designs between the two types of
latches was immaterial because there was no difference in the relevant
characteristics of the two designs. 47 The court noted that the defendant's expert testified that the latch in the plaintiffs' car was superior
to the latch involved in twenty-eight of the incidents. 48 The court of
appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
relied on this testimony to conclude that those twenty-eight incidents

40.
41.
(2001);
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 280-82, 630 S.E.2d at 887-88.
See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454, 455, 543 S.E.2d 21, 23-24
see also Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 53 MERCER L. REV. 295, 300-02 (2001).
Colp, 279 Ga. App. at 281, 630 S.E.2d at 887.
Id. at 282, 630 S.E.2d at 888.
Id. at 282-83, 630 S.E.2d at 888.
Id. at 283, 630 S.E.2d at 888.
Id. at 280, 630 S.E.2d at 887.
Id. at 284-85, 630 S.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 282, 630 S.E.2d at 888.
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were not sufficiently similar.49 The remaining two incidents offered to
prove defect or causation involved a different type of collision, and
therefore the trial court acted within its discretion when it held that
those incidents did not share a common causation with the plaintiffs'
collision. 50 Finally, the court of appeals held that the seven lawsuits
were not admissible to prove notice because they involved the older
design."'
Although the court of appeals decision in Snider v. Basilo5 2 does not
specifically mention extrinsic act evidence, it illustrates one limit on the
use of evidence of extrinsic acts in a civil case. In Snider, a medical
negligence action, the plaintiff contended that the trial court improperly
excluded evidence that a nurse employed by one of the defendants had
failed the Georgia State Board of Nursing licensing examination three
times.53 Relying on Williams v. Memorial Medical Center,5 4 the court
of appeals disagreed.55
In Williams the court held that because
evidence that a physician had failed to pass certification and license
examinations did not make it probable that he was negligent in the
transaction at issue, the failure to pass these tests was not admissible.56 Similarly, in Snider the court reasoned that the issue was
whether the nurse had met the applicable standard of care, and the fact
that she had 5not
passed a licensing examination was simply not relevant
7
to that issue.
V.

PRWILEGES

Civil litigants rejoice when an opponent refuses to answer deposition
questions or provide other information during discovery on the grounds
that the responses may incriminate him. While a party is free to invoke
state or federal privileges against incrimination in a civil action, the civil
jury can infer that the answer to the question would, in fact, incriminate
the witness. Thus, to take an extreme example, in a tort action against
an allegedly drunk driver, the plaintiff can ask the defendant whether

49. Id. at 285, 630 S.E.2d at 890.
50. Id. at 285-86, 630 S.E.2d at 890.
51. Id. at 286, 630 S.E.2d at 891.
52. 276 Ga. App. 315, 623 S.E.2d 521 (2005), cert. granted.
53. Id. at 315, 317, 623 S.E.2d at 523-24.
54. 218 Ga. App. 107, 460 S.E.2d 558 (1995).
55. Snider, 276 Ga. App. at 318, 623 S.E.2d at 525.
56. Williams, 218 Ga. App. at 108, 460 S.E.2d at 560-61.
57. Snider, 276 Ga. App. at 318-19, 623 S.E.2d at 525. On a related issue concerning
extrinsic evidence offered for impeachment rather than for substantive purposes, the court
in Snider held that the trial court properly prohibited plaintiffs from cross-examining the
defendant's expert about the fact that he had been a defendant in a malpractice case. Id.
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he drank two cases of beer shortly before getting behind the wheel of his
car. When the defendant invokes his privilege not to provide information that could be used against him in a criminal action, his invocation
of that privilege in the civil case can be used against him and the jury
can infer that because he refused to answer the question, he did, in fact,
consume two cases of beer.
To avoid this result, civil defendants sometimes attempt to avoid being
deposed at all. But, as held during the survey period by the court of
appeals in Dempsey v. Kaminski Jewelry, Inc.,5 8 the defendant must sit
for the deposition and invoke his privilege in response to the specific
questions that he claims will elicit incriminating information.59 In
Dempsey a jeweler sued a former employee who had been criminally
charged with stealing jewelry from the jeweler. After filing suit, the
jeweler served the defendant with a notice for her deposition. Although
the opinion does not say so, the jeweler's attorney no doubt wanted to
pose very specific questions to the defendant, force her to invoke her
privilege against incrimination in response to those questions, and then
use her invocation of the privilege as evidence that she, in fact, stole
from her employer. To avoid this, the defendant moved for a protective
order, which the trial court denied, but it granted a certificate of
immediate review to the court of appeals.6 ° On interlocutory appeal,
the court of appeals acknowledged that a civil litigant can invoke her
privilege against incrimination, but she cannot do so on a "blanket"
basis.61 Rather, in a civil case, the defendant can only invoke his
privilege in response to specific questions.62 This allows a trial court
to determine whether the privilege has been properly invoked. Thus,
the court of appeals held that the defendant would have to appear for
her deposition and answer specific questions about her alleged theft.64

58. 278 Ga. App. 814, 630 S.E.2d 77 (2006).
59. Id. at 815-16, 630 S.E.2d at 80 (citing Tennesco, Inc. v. Berger, 144 Ga. App. 45, 48,
240 S.E.2d 586, 588 (1977)).
60. Id. at 814-15, 630 S.E.2d at 79.
61. Id. at 815-16, 630 S.E.2d at 80.
62. Id. at 816, 630 S.E.2d at 80 (citing Tennesco, 144 Ga. App. at 48, 240 S.E.2d at
588).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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WITNESSES

Cross-Examination

A.

Georgia law guarantees litigants the right to a "thorough and sifting
cross-examination."" Nonetheless, a sharply-divided seven-judge panel
of the court of appeals struggled with defining the breadth of that right
in Craft v. State.6 6 In Craft the defendant, who allegedly stood in the
doorway of his home and masturbated in the presence of two fifteenyear-old school girls, contended that the trial court, by its questioning of
a witness, improperly bolstered the credibility of the victims and then,
to compound the error, improperly restricted the defendant's crossexamination of that witness.67
In the midst of direct examination, the court interjected and asked the
witness, the assistant principal at the girls' school, "'Do you know what
kind of students these two girls are?"'68 The witness responded that
the girls were polite and well-mannered. The witness also said that one
of the girls was a cheerleader, and this prompted the court to ask
whether cheerleaders were required to maintain a certain grade point
average; the principal replied that they were. On cross-examination, the
defendant's attorney attempted to ask the principal about less attractive
aspects of the girls' school experiences. When the court restricted this
cross-examination, the defendant informed the court that he had
documentation that the girls had been disciplined at school on several
occasions. 69 The court maintained its ruling that it was
not going to
70
allow the defendant "'to make these victims look bad.'"
The court of appeals first held that the court's questioning was
improper because it bolstered the credibility of the victims. 7 ' However,
the defendant did not object to this line of questioning at trial, and the
court concluded that the trial court's questioning, by itself, did not
constitute plain error. 72 Nevertheless, having bolstered the credibility
of the victims, the trial court opened the door to a thorough and sifting

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

O.C.G.A. § 24-9-64 (1995).
274 Ga. App. 410, 618 S.E.2d 104 (2005).
Id. at 410-11, 618 S.E.2d at 105-06.
Id. at 411, 618 S.E.2d at 106.
Id. at 412, 618 S.E.2d at 107.
Id.
Id., 618 S.E.2d at 106.
Id., 618 S.E.2d at 106-07.
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cross-examination of the principal by the defendant, and the abridgment
of this right was reversible error.7"
Only two judges fully concurred in the majority's analysis.74 Two
others concurred in the result but wrote separately to note that they
could not "fully endorse the analysis employed" by the majority
opinion.75 However, it is difficult to discern any appreciable difference
between the concurring judges' analysis and the majority's analysis. The
concurring judges concluded that the court's questioning was improper,
but the questioning did not, by itself, constitute plain error.76 In
addition, like the majority opinion, the concurring judges concluded that
the court's restriction of the defendant's cross-examination of the
principal violated the defendant's right to a thorough and sifting crossexamination.77 Three judges dissented and argued that the trial
judge's questions were not improper and that the trial court permitted
sufficient cross-examination of the principal to satisfy the defendant's
right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination. 8
B.

Impeachment by Evidence of Character

As discussed above, extrinsic act evidence is generally inadmissible
when offered for substantive purposes, although exceptions, such as the
similar transaction rule, tend to swallow the general rule. Extrinsic act
evidence is also generally inadmissible to impeach or bolster witnesses.
As discussed in last year's survey,7 9 in 2005 the Georgia General
Assembly generally adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 608, ° which
governs the use of character and other extrinsic evidence to impeach a
witness.8 " New O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84 provides that evidence of a
witness's bad character is admissible only if the evidence refers to the
witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness."
Evidence of
the witness's truthful character is "admissible only after the character
of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by reputation evidence

73. Id. at 411-13, 618 S.E.2d at 106-07.
74. Id. at 415, 618 S.E.2d at 108.
75. Id. (Ruffin, C.J., & Blackburn, J., concurring specially).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 415-16, 618 S.E.2d at 108-09.
78. Id. at 419, 618 S.E.2d at 111 (Andrews, P.J., Johnson, P.J., & Mikell, J.,
dissenting).
79. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 200 (2005).
80. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84 (Supp. 2006).
81. See generally Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 200 (2005);
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.
82. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84(1).
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or otherwise."83 In attacking general character for truthfulness, the
"particular transactions or the opinions of single individuals shall not be
inquired of on either side, except upon cross-examination in seeking for
the extent and foundation of the witness's knowledge."84
It must be remembered, however, that O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84
addresses only impeaching or bolstering a witness's general character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness. It does not address the use of extrinsic
acts to impeach a witness's specific testimony.85 However, the line
between impeachment of general character and impeachment of specific
testimony can be hard to define, and it is unclear what impact new
O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84 may have in criminal cases. For example, prior
to the adoption of O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84, criminal defendants who
opened the door to general bad character evidence could be impeached
with evidence of specific instances of misconduct.8 6 Before the supreme
court decision in Jones v. State, 7 an adroit prosecutor could easily
place a defendant in a position that opened the door to cross-examination about prior misconduct. Prior to Jones, courts routinely held that
a defendant placed his character in issue and thus was subject to
impeachment with evidence of misconduct if he testified to less than all
of his prior criminal conduct. However, in Jones the court held that a
defendant only places his character in issue when he has made an
express election to do so.88
During the current survey period, a divided supreme court addressed
the limits of Jones. In Harris v. State,89 the defendant was asked on
direct examination if she had ever been convicted of a felony and she
replied that she had not. The trial court then allowed the prosecutor,
over objection, to cross-examine the defendant about prior misdemeanor
convictions. 90 On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court
should not have allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant
about her misdemeanor convictions because she never testified that she
had no misdemeanor convictions. 91 The supreme court acknowledged
that Jones allows prosecutors to cross-examine defendants about prior
convictions when a defendant makes her good character an issue at

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. § 24-9-84(2).
Id. § 24-9-84(4).
See id. § 24-9-84.
Bland v. State, 198 Ga. App. 671, 672, 402 S.E.2d 782, 783 (1991).
257 Ga. 753, 363 S.E.2d 529 (1988).
Id. at 758, 363 S.E.2d at 533-34.
279 Ga. 522, 615 S.E.2d 532 (2005).
Id. at 525, 615 S.E.2d at 536.
Id.
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trial.92
Defendants place their character in issue when they offer
evidence about their general good reputation in the community or by
adducing evidence of specific acts of good conduct.9" The prosecution
can also use prior convictions to impeach a defendant's specific
testimony.94 What this meant in Harris, the court reasoned, was that
when the defendant testified she had not been convicted of a felony, the
prosecution could have impeached her with evidence tending to establish
that she had been convicted of felonies. 95 However, evidence that the
defendant had been convicted of misdemeanors did not disprove her
testimony that she had not been convicted of felonies, and thus crossexamining her about misdemeanor convictions was improper.9 "
Furthermore, the defendant, by testifying that she had not committed
a felony, did not imply that she had not engaged in criminal conduct.97
Had she done so, she would have opened the door to evidence of prior
criminal activity.9 8 Nonetheless, because it was not highly probable
that the error contributed to the judgment, the court concluded that this
error was harmless. 99
In special concurrences, Justices Thompson and Hines maintained that
"the majority opinion unfairly hamstrings the State in cross-examining
a defendant who implies that he or she has no criminal record."0 0
Justice Thompson argued that the defendant's denial that she had been
convicted of a felony "implied that she had no prior criminal record" and
thus opened the door for cross-examination about the criminal activity. 01 Justice Hines, in a separate concurrence, agreed.0 2 According
to Justice Hines, the defendant's testimony suggested a "criminal record
[that] is less serious than it actually is, [and thus]
the State has the
10 3
right to challenge the accuracy of that testimony."
It would seem that the majority thought that the prosecution was
attempting to impeach the defendant's specific testimony. Because the
evidence proffered by the prosecution did not impeach that testimony, it

92.

Id. at 526, 615 S.E.2d at 536.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id., 615 S.E.2d at 537.
Id.
Id.
Id.

98.

Id. at 526-27, 615 S.E.2d at 536-37.

99. Id. at 527, 615 S.E.2d at 538 (citing Clark v. State, 248 Ga. App. 88, 90, 545
S.E.2d 637, 640 (2001)).

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 529, 615 S.E.2d at 539 (Thompson, J., concurring specially).
Id. at 530, 615 S.E.2d at 539.
Id. (Hines, J., concurring specially).
Id.
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was improper.0 4 The concurring judges, on the other hand, seem to
have concluded that the defendant offered testimony about her general
character and that this testimony opened the door for questions about
other criminal conduct, even though that conduct did not concern
felonies. Which approach is correct, it would seem, depends on which
assumption is valid. If the prosecution was attempting to impeach the
defendant's specific testimony, then the majority was correct because, as
the majority held, questioning the defendant about her misdemeanor
convictions did not impeach her testimony that she had no felony
convictions. If, on the other hand, the concurring judges correctly
assumed that the defendant had placed her character in issue and was
contending that she had a good character because she had no felony
convictions, then the prosecution properly cross-examined her about
instances of misconduct, regardless of whether they were felonies or
misdemeanors. Again, the dividing line between evidence offered to
impeach character and evidence offered to impeach specific testimony
sometimes can be difficult to discern.
C.

Competency of Jurors as Witnesses

In Georgia the affidavits of jurors are admissible "to sustain but not
to impeach their verdict.""'5 The Federal Rules of Evidence take what
many would consider a more logical approach: Jurors are not competent
to testify except with regard to external or extraneous information or
The court of appeals
outside influence on their deliberations.16
decision in Gaines v. Statel°7 illustrates, at least in criminal cases, the
advantages of the approach of the Federal Rules.
In Gaines the defendant learned after his conviction that a juror who
claimed not to know the defendant during voir dire communicated to her
fellow jurors extremely prejudicial information about the defendant. The
defendant moved for a new trial and in support of this motion adduced
testimony by two jurors to the effect that the information provided by
the juror in question led them to vote for the defendant's conviction.'
On appeal from the denial of the defendant's motion for new trial, the
court of appeals acknowledged the Georgia rule that testimony of jurors
is not admissible to impeach their verdict.109 However, the court noted
that if prejudicial extraneous information is communicated to jurors, a

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Harris,279 Ga. at 527, 615 S.E.2d at 537.
O.C.G.A. § 17-9-41 (2004); O.C.G.A. § 9-10-9 (1982).
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
274 Ga. App. 575, 618 S.E.2d 197 (2005).
Id. at 575-76, 618 S.E.2d at 197-98.
Id. at 576-77, 618 S.E.2d at 198.
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criminal defendant may be deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation." 0
For example, in Watkins v. State,"' the Georgia
Supreme Court held that a defendant's right of confrontation was
violated when two jurors visited the scene of an alleged crime and
presented their findings to their fellow jurors. 112 These jurors became,
in effect, unsworn witnesses against the defendant."'
In such a
situation, the rule that jurors are not competent to impeach their verdict
must yield to the preservation of a defendant's constitutional right to
confront his witnesses." 4 Thus in Gaines, juror testimony was admissible to demonstrate that extrajudicial information was injected into the
jury's deliberations." 5 Because it was undisputed that this information had influenced jurors, the court of appeals reversed the defendant's
conviction." 6
VII.

EXPERT WITNESSES

As discussed in some detail in last year's survey,117 in 2005 the
Georgia General Assembly, as a part of "tort reform" legislation, adopted,
more or less, the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,"' now codified at O.C.G.A. section 24-967.1."' However, the General Assembly, in its wisdom, exempted
criminal cases from new O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1.120 Apparently,
junk science is acceptable in criminal cases. In its 2006 session, the
General Assembly exempted another class of cases from O.C.G.A. section
24-9-67.1.121 The grandly titled Landowner's Bill of Rights and Private
Property Protection Act, 1 22 which revised Georgia's eminent domain
law in response to the United States Supreme Court decision in Kelo v.
2
included new O.C.G.A. section 22-1-14,124
City of New London,'
which addresses the use of lay or expert testimony to establish the value

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See id. at 577, 618 S.E.2d at 198-99.
237 Ga. 678, 229 S.E.2d 465 (1976).
Id. at 684, 229 S.E.2d at 470.
Id.
Id. at 685, 229 S.E.2d at 470.
274 Ga. App. at 578, 618 S.E.2d at 199.
Id., 618 S.E.2d at 199-200.
See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 204-05 (2005).
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2006).
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 205 (2005).
Ga. H.B. 1313, Reg. Sess. (2005).
Id.
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
O.C.G.A. § 22-1-14 (Supp. 2006).
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of condemned properties.' 2 5 O.C.G.A. section 22-1-14(b) provides that
O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1 does not apply to expert testimony in
condemnation cases. 126 Thus, it seems that condemnation cases, like
criminal cases, do not warrant the protection Daubert supposedly
provides from unreliable testimony.
Ironically, while the General Assembly was exempting some testimony
on the issue of value from Georgia's new Daubert statute, 27 the courts,
in other value cases, applied O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1 with vigor. In
Moran v. Kia Motors, Inc.,28 the plaintiff sought to recover damages
allegedly resulting from the breach of an automobile warranty. The trial
court excluded the testimony of an expert witness retained by the
plaintiff to establish the value of the vehicle in its defective condition. 129 Although not clear from the opinion, it appeared that the case
would have been tried prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. section 24-967.1, but the court of appeals nonetheless relied on O.C.G.A. section 249-67.1 to affirm the trial court. 30 Contrary to the lengthy Daubert
analysis typically found in federal cases, the court of appeals Daubert
discussion consisted of two paragraphs, the bulk of which was devoted
to quoting the statute. The plaintiff's expert had based his opinion on
repair records and a formula he devised that was based on values listed
in the Kelley Blue Book. He had relied on this method for approximately
one year and had used it in five to ten prior proceedings in which he had
testified.' 3' The court noted that although this methodology had been
relied upon in the automotive field by others, there was no evidence
about the method's rate of error and there was no evidence that it had
been reviewed by other qualified experts. 32 Based on this, the court
of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it excluded the expert's testimony." 33
Georgia law has long taken a rather practical-and liberal-approach
to lay opinion testimony on the issue of value. For example, when a
homeowner attempts to establish the value of items of personal property
destroyed in a fire, it is sufficient if he testifies to the purchase price or
replacement cost of the property and the approximate date he acquired

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Ga. H.B. 1313.
O.C.G.A. § 22-1-14.
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1.
276 Ga. App. 96, 622 S.E.2d 439 (2006).
Id. at 96, 622 S.E.2d at 440.
Id. at 97, 99, 622 S.E.2d at 440, 442.
Id. at 97-98, 622 S.E.2d at 441.
Id. at 98, 622 S.E.2d at 441.
Id.
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the property.'
However, that may be changing. In Hill v. MercedesBenz USA, LLC, 35 another automobile breach of warranty case, the
court of appeals affirmed a trial court's conclusion that an owner's
affidavit was insufficient lay opinion evidence of value.'36 In her
affidavit, the owner testified that she was familiar with vehicles
generally, with purchasing vehicles, and with the cost of vehicles. She
further testified that she had researched the market to compare prices
when purchasing the automobile in question and her previous automobiles. She then testified in her affidavit with regard to the alleged
defects in the vehicle and concluded that had she known about those
137
defects, she would not have paid more than $10,000 for the vehicle.
Interestingly, in an opinion later withdrawn, the court of appeals first
held that this affidavit was sufficient to create a jury issue with regard
to the diminished value of the automobile.3' However, in a substitute
opinion, the court noted that the owner did not have any specialized
knowledge with regard to car repair or how cars were manufactured.3 9
Nor was her opinion based on objective information found in published
valuation guides. 4 ° Accordingly, the court held that her lay opinion
was not sufficient for the jury to determine the car's value.'
In Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert,'42 the court of appeals addressed the question of whether an expert has to be licensed in order to
render expert testimony.'43 The defendant contended that the affidavit
attached to the plaintiff's professional negligence action in accordance
with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1'4 was insufficient because the doctor
giving the affidavit was not licensed at the time he gave it and thus was
incompetent to give expert testimony.4 Applying pre-O.C.G.A. section

134. Braner v. S. Trust Ins. Co., 255 Ga. 117, 121, 335 S.E.2d 547, 552 (1985); see also
Hoard v. Whiley, 113 Ga. App. 328, 332, 147 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1966) (applying a somewhat
stricter rule in other situations but still holding that lay opinion is admissible to establish
value if the witness establishes that he has some knowledge, experience, or familiarity with
the value of the property or similar property and that he has had an opportunity to form
an opinion as to the value of the property).
135. 274 Ga. App. 826, 619 S.E.2d 353 (2005).
136. Id. at 826-27, 619 S.E.2d at 353.
137. Id. at 828-29, 619 S.E.2d at 354-55.
138. Hill v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. A05A0114, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 853, at *910 (June 22, 2005) vacated, 274 Ga. App. 826, 619 S.E.2d 353.
139. Hill, 274 Ga. App. at 829, 619 S.E.2d at 355.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 830, 619 S.E.2d at 356.
142. 277 Ga. App. 895, 627 S.E.2d 821 (2006).
143. See id. at 896-98, 627 S.E.2d at 824-25.
144. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2006).
145. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 277 Ga. App. at 898, 627 S.E.2d at 825.
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24-9-67.1 law, the court of appeals rejected this argument, noting that
Georgia law does not require that an expert be licensed in order to
testify.146 However, the defendant also argued that O.C.G.A. section
24-9-67.1 should be applied and that it required that the experts be
licensed. 14 The court rejected this argument as well."4 O.C.G.A.
section 24-9-67.1 only requires that the expert be licensed at the time of
the alleged negligence, 149 and the expert in this case was licensed at
the time the allegedly negligent act occurred. 5 o
Previous survey articles have chronicled the apparent confusion over
whether an expert witness can base his opinion on hearsay.'
Older
cases addressing the issue hold that an expert cannot, to any extent,
base his opinion on hearsay, but a line of more recent cases have held
to the contrary, the earliest of which was King v. Browning.15 2 Since
then, the Georgia courts appear to be moving in the direction of allowing
experts to base their opinions, to some extent, on hearsay. During the
current survey period, the court of appeals held in Nichols v. State5
that a doctor may express opinions with regard to a patient's injuries
based on hearsay information contained in the patient's medical
records. 1'

In this age of Daubert,courts spend a lot of time and energy determining whether expert testimony on issues of causation is sufficiently
reliable to be admissible. In the context of medical issues, this
discussion often centers on whether a medical opinion has been
expressed within a reasonable degree of medical probability or certainty.
With that in mind, the supreme court's decision in Bailey v. Edmundson 155 may come as a surprise to many. In Bailey, a will contest case,
the trial court admitted a medical narrative from the decedent's
oncologist pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18.156 The narrative
stated that drugs taken by the decedent "'can cause' altered mental
status and agitation." 5 ' The appellant argued that an opinion that

146. Id. at 900, 627 S.E.2d at 826-27.
147. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 827.
148. Id.
149. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1.
150. Tenet HealthcareCorp., 277 Ga. App. at 900, 627 S.E.2d at 827.
151. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 309, 327-28 (2002); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 46 MERCER L. REV. 233, 250-51 (1994).
152. 246 Ga. 46, 268 S.E.2d 653 (1980).
153. 278 Ga. App. 46, 628 S.E.2d 131 (2006).
154. Id. at 49, 628 S.E.2d at 134.
155. 280 Ga. 528, 630 S.E.2d 396 (2006).
156. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-18 (Supp. 2006).
157. Bailey, 280 Ga. at 532, 630 S.E.2d at 400.

20061

EVIDENCE

something "could cause" an effect was not relevant because it only
expressed a possibility, rather than a probability, that the drugs caused
the decedent to experience side effects.158 The supreme court disagreed.159 The court acknowledged that an opinion that merely
expressed a possibility is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain a party's
burden of proof.16 ° The burden requires evidence tending to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence-i.e., that it is more likely than
not-that the drugs caused the side effects. As the court put it,
"[E]xpert medical testimony as to the mere possibility of a causal
relationship between a given occurrence and a subsequent mental
condition, although not sufficient to sustain a burden of proof, is
nevertheless clearly admissible." 6 ' Thus, the oncologist's opinion was
admissible even though it established only a possibility rather than a
probability.'6 2 This testimony, along with other evidence, was relevant
to a determination
of whether the drugs actually impacted the decedent's
63
mental status.
Numerous survey articles written by the Author since 1988 have
attempted to analyze dozens of cases in which courts have struggled
with the question of whether expert testimony is admissible to prove or
disprove that a child was sexually abused. Because this struggle
emanated from two apparently conflicting supreme court decisions, State
v. Butler" and Allison v. State,'65 the Author referred to this struggle as the Butler/Allison debate. 6 The issue in Butler/Allison cases
is whether an expert has improperly bolstered the credibility of a
victim's claims of molestation by testifying, essentially, that a victim was
molested.
In 2002 the court of appeals in Smith v. State"7 took the Butler/Allison debate in a slightly different direction. In Smith the court
of appeals held that the trial court properly allowed a licensed clinical

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Jacobs v. Pilgrim, 186 Ga. App. 260, 262, 367 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1988)).
161. Id.
162. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 401.
163. Id.
164. 256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986).
165. 256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987).
166. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 210-211 (2005); Marc
T. Treadwell, Evidence, 53 MERCER L. REV. 295, 302-303 (2001); Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 229, 243-244 (1993); see generally Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REV. 213, 216-20 (1992).
167. 257 Ga. App. 88, 570 S.E.2d 400 (2002).
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social worker to testify that she believed the victim's claims of
abuse. 168 The court reasoned that because the defendant had attacked
the victim's credibility, the door had been opened for the social worker
to testify that in her opinion, the child was truthful.'6 9 During the
current survey period, the court of appeals returned to this issue in
Patterson v. State.170 In Patterson the trial court, relying on Smith,
held that an expert could testify that he believed the victim because the
defendant had attacked the victim's credibility.'
Pursuant to Smith,
the trial court's ruling was correct, but a unanimous court of appeals
found it necessary to overrule Smith. 7 ' Georgia law has long held, the
court reasoned, that a witness, even an expert witness, cannot express
an opinion on another witness's credibility.17 3 Smith had been the sole
exception to this long-standing principle, and the court concluded that
its decision in Smith was plainly wrong. 74 Clearly then, one witness,
even an expert, cannot express an opinion on the credibility of another
witness.
However, as demonstrated by the supreme court's decision in Harris
v. State,'7 5 the court's holding in Patterson did not impact the main
principle to be drawn from the Butler/Allison debate. Specifically,
experts do not improperly bolster the credibility of a witness or invade
the province of a jury when experts testify that their findings are
"consistent" with the victim's allegations.'76
VIII.

HEARSAY

A.

Definition of Hearsay
Georgia has always been a bit schizophrenic with regard to its
definition of hearsay. Is a hearsay statement one that is made out of
court and offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, as
stated in many cases, 77 or is it evidence "which does not derive its
value solely from the credit of the witness but rests mainly on the
veracity and competency of other persons," as stated in O.C.G.A. section

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 92, 570 S.E.2d at 405.
Id.
278 Ga. App. 168, 628 S.E.2d 618 (2006).
Id. at 169, 628 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 173, 628 S.E.2d at 621.
See id. at 170, 628 S.E.2d at 619-20.
See id. at 170-73, 628 S.E.2d at 620-21.
279 Ga. App. 570, 631 S.E.2d 772 (2006).
Id. at 571, 631 S.E.2d at 775.
See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REv. 213, 235-36 (1992).
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24-3-1?'18 The court of appeals decision in Smith v. State179 may add
another layer of confusion to the determination of whether testimony is
or is not hearsay.
In Smith the defendant contended that the trial court erroneously
allowed a detective to give hearsay testimony. The defendant's defense
was based on alibi-he claimed he was with his girlfriend."' 0 The
detective, however, had testified at trial that his investigation "revealed"
that the defendant was not with his girlfriend at the time of the
robbery.181 The defendant "vociferous[ly]" argued that the detective's
testimony was hearsay; the detective clearly was testifying to something
he had learned during his investigation.'8 2 The defendant argued that
this testimony must have been based on hearsay because the detective
had no personal knowledge of where the defendant was at the time of
the crime."' The court of appeals, for some reason, was not impressed:
The officer was asked merely whether, during the course of his
investigation, he learned that Smith was not with his girlfriend at the
time of the robbery. The officer answered affirmatively. The officer
was not asked to repeat the testimony of an out-of-court declarant. As
such, no hearsay was elicited, and Smith's contention fails.184
Thus, pursuant to Smith, if the examiner merely refrains from asking
the witness to restate the declarant's out-of-court statement and the
witness only testifies to the substance of those statements-that is, what
the detective learned during his investigation-there is no hearsay
problem.
Smith can be contrasted with the court of appeals decision in Diaz v.
State,' which provides a more meaningful hearsay analysis. In Diaz
the defendant contended that his conviction was based on inadmissible
hearsay, specifically information provided by a confidential informant.8 6 However, the court of appeals construed the evidence differently.8 7 The court concluded that the witnesses testified not about
what the confidential informant said, but rather what the witnesses

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1 (1995).
274 Ga. App. 852, 619 S.E.2d 358 (2005).
Id. at 854, 619 S.E.2d at 360.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
275 Ga. App. 557, 621 S.E.2d 543 (2005).
Id. at 557, 621 S.E.2d at 544.
Id.
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themselves observed and did.'88 Hearsay, the court wrote, is "when a
witness at trial offers evidence of what someone else said or wrote,
outside of court, and the proponent's use of the evidence essentially asks
the jury to assume that the out-of-court declarant was not lying or
mistaken when the statement was made."18 9 In Diaz the witness's
testimony did not ask the jury to assume the truth of out-of-court
statements; rather, it simply illustrated what was said and observed.19 This, the court held, was not hearsay.191 In Smith, on the
other hand, although the detective did not specifically quote someone
who did not testify at trial, his testimony was clearly based on what
someone told him and the prosecution wanted the jury to believe that
information. 192
B.

Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation

It has been almost three years since the United States Supreme Court
in Crawford v. Washington'9 3 dramatically altered the playing field
with regard to the use of hearsay in criminal cases. In Crawford the
defendant contended that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to
hear his wife's tape-recorded statement to police officers. The prosecution tendered this evidence after the defendant's wife invoked her
spousal privilege, and thus was unable to testify.'94 The trial court and
the Washington Supreme Court held that the circumstances of the
statement were sufficiently reliable to overcome the defendant's
argument that the admission of the out-of-court statement violated his
Sixth Amendment 95 right of confrontation.'9 6 The prosecutors argued that since the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 9 '
courts have increasingly allowed the admission of hearsay statements if
the statements fell within a "'firmly rooted hearsay exception"' or if they
bore "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."" 9
It was the
latter language---"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"-that
courts across the country interpreted as a green light to admit hearsay
testimony. In Georgia, this bypass around the Sixth Amendment came
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Id. at 559, 621 S.E.2d at 545.
Id. (quoting Shelton v. State, 260 Ga. App. 855, 857, 581 S.E.2d 378, 380 (2003)).
Id.
Id. at 557-58, 621 S.E.2d at 544.
See Smith, 274 Ga. App. at 854, 619 S.E.2d at 360.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 40.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41.
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
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to be known as the necessity exception to the hearsay rule. 99 As
discussed in many prior surveys, the rapid expansion of the necessity
exception, to exaggerate only a bit, seemed on the verge of supplanting
live testimony entirely. °°
Finally, it seemed, the United States Supreme Court, conservative
though it may have been at the time, had had enough and granted
certiorari in Crawford.20 1 The Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation was not limited to in-court testimony, but
also applied to out-of-court "testimonial" statements. °2 Testimonial
statements included affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony,
and "'similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially. '' 2 3 Thus, a testimonial out-of-court
statement is no longer admissible if the defendant has not had an
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. °4 Since Crawford, cases
have primarily focused on whether an out-of-court statement is
testimonial, which continued to be the case during the survey period.
In Pitts v. State,0 5 the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to
the court of appeals to address the question of whether a recording of a
911 emergency call was testimonial. 2 6 The court of appeals, in a
decision discussed in last year's survey,20 ' held with little discussion
that 911 calls were not testimonial and were, in any event, admissible
as part of the res gestae. 2 8 The supreme court took a more thorough
look at the issue.
First, the supreme court noted that post-Crawford cases across the
country had reached conflicting results when considering whether 911
calls were testimonial.0 9 Some, the court noted, have held that such
calls are always testimonial "because it involves a statement to a
government officer that an objective person understands could always be
used in a future prosecution."210 Other courts, on the other hand, have
held that 911 calls are not testimonial in nature because they are not

199. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323, 351-54 (1996).
200. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 56 MERCER L. REV. 235, 247-48 (2004).
201. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
202. Id. at 50-51, 68.
203. Id. at 51.
204. Id. at 59.
205. 280 Ga. 288, 627 S.E.2d 17 (2006).
206. Id. at 288, 627 S.E.2d at 18.
207. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 57 MERCER L. REV. 187, 215-16 (2005).
208. Pitts v. State, 272 Ga. App. 182, 187, 612 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2005), affd, 280 Ga. 288,
627 S.E.2d 17 (2006).
209. Pitts, 280 Ga. at 289, 627 S.E.2d at 19.
210. Id.
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initiated by law enforcement officers and the caller's statements are not
"'in response to structured police interrogation.'" 21' The Georgia
Supreme Court declined to follow either of these extreme positions;
instead, the court held that the determination of whether a 911 call is
testimonial must be made on a case-by-case basis.212 If the primary
purpose of the telephone call is to establish evidentiary facts that an
objective person would recognize could be used in a future prosecution,
then the call is testimonial.2 18 However, if the call is made to report
a crime in progress or to seek assistance because of imminent danger,
then the caller's statements are not testimonial." 4 The court's analysis seemed similar to the test for the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule, and indeed the court of appeals, in dicta, had noted
that
215
the 911 recording could be admissible as an excited utterance.
In Pitts the 911 telephone call was made by a wife who was estranged
from her husband. She reported that her husband had broken into her
home and that she needed assistance. Although the wife stated during
the course of the call that her husband was violating his parole by being
in the house, the context of the call made clear that the wife was calling
to report criminal activity and to request assistance. 21 6' Under these
circumstances, the court held that the wife's statements to the 911
operator were not testimonial.2 17
Although Crawford addressed Washington State's version of a
necessity exception to the hearsay rule and Crawford's primary impact
in Georgia has been in necessity exception cases, Crawfordis not limited
to testimony admitted pursuant to the necessity exception. Evidence
admitted under other hearsay exceptions, even well-established
exceptions, can run afoul of Crawford if the out-of-court statement is
testimonial in nature.
In Rackoff v. State,"' the defendant contended that an inspection
certificate attesting to the accuracy of an alcohol breath testing
instrument was testimonial in nature, and therefore the admission of the
certificate violated his right of confrontation.219 Under O.C.G.A.
section 40-6-392(f),22 ° breath-testing instruments must be inspected
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275 Ga. App. 737, 621 S.E.2d 841 (2005), cert. granted.
Id. at 740-41, 621 S.E.2d at 845.
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(f) (2004).

2006]

EVIDENCE

175

and the inspector must prepare a sworn certificate attesting that the
instrument is in good working order. 22' The defendant acknowledged
that the supreme court in Brown v. State22 2 held that such certificates
were admissible pursuant to the business records exception to the rule
against hearsay.223 The defendant contended, however, that Crawford
nullified Brown because the certificate was testimonial in nature.224
The court of appeals disagreed. 22' Relying on Brown, the court noted
that the certificate is simply a record made in the regular course of
business, and it is not prepared in anticipation of prosecution against
any particular defendant. 22 ' Therefore, the inspection certificate was
not testimonial.2 27
A co-conspirator's statement, though admissible under the coconspirator exception of the hearsay rule, can run afoul of Crawford if
the co-conspirator's statement is testimonial. This was the contention
made by the defendant in Bowden v. State.22' There, the court of
appeals easily rejected this argument, noting that the statements were
made during the course of the criminal conspiracy, and although made
to an informant, were not made to the police.229
Although most cases applying Crawford concern the issue of whether
the statement is testimonial, Georgia courts have also addressed the
second element of Crawford: whether the declarant was available for
cross-examination. If so, then Crawford is not implicated. In Howell v.
State,"' the defendant contended that a child's out-of-court statements
admitted pursuant to the Child Hearsay Statute 231 violated Crawford
because the child's statements were testimonial.2 32 The statements
were clearly testimonial in nature, but the court noted that testimony is
admissible pursuant to the Child Hearsay Statute only if (1) the child is
available to testify and (2) the prosecution announced during trial that
the victim was available for cross-examination. 23 Howell illustrates
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Id. at 636-38, 629 S.E.2d at 403-04.

176

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

the dilemma faced by defendants in child molestation cases. Although
the victim may be available for cross-examination, it is doubtful that any
defense attorney relishes the thought of cross-examining a six-year-old
child abuse victim. If, however, the child is available for cross-examination, Crawford does not bar the admission of the child's out-of-court
statement, no matter how unattractive the prospect of actually crossexamining the child may be.
In Hardeman v. State,234 the defendant contended that the admission of the transcript of a witness's testimony from a probation
revocation hearing violated Crawford. Again, the testimony was clearly
testimonial in nature, and thus the case turned on whether the witness,
who invoked his Fifth Amendment235 right not to testify at the defendant's trial, was available for cross-examination by the defendant's
attorney. As it turned out, the defendant's attorney had appeared at a
probation revocation hearing and had ample opportunity to crossO.C.G.A. section 24-3-10236 allows for the
examine the witness.
admission of prior testimony in criminal cases if the prior testimony
concerned "substantially the same issue and [concerned] substantially
the same parties."2 37 The witness's testimony at the probation revocaIn the future, defense attorneys
tion hearing met this standard.
likely should consider whether they should appear at collateral hearings
on behalf of clients where they may have an opportunity to crossexamine witnesses who will be unavailable at a subsequent trial.
It must be remembered that Crawford did not hold that hearsay
exceptions, such as the necessity exception, were invalid; rather, it held
that testimonial hearsay could not be admitted if the defendant had not
had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 239 Thus, Georgia's
necessity exception is still available, albeit on a much more limited
basis. Georgia's necessity exception requires the presence of three
elements: (1) "the declarant must be unavailable to testify;" (2) "there
must be particularized guarantees of the statement's trustworthiness;"
and (3) "the statement must be both relevant to a material fact and more
probative regarding that fact than any other evidence." 240 The supreme court's decision in Belmar v. State241 illustrates the nature of
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the proof necessary to establish that the statement is sufficiently
trustworthy. In Belmar the trial court admitted the testimony of the
victim's mother concerning statements made to her by the victim.
However, the State adduced no evidence about the victim's truthfulness
or the nature of the mother's relationship with her son.242 Accordingly,
the court held that "[tihe existence of a familial relationship alone is not
sufficient to establish the required particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 2 43
C.

Prior Statements by Witnesses

Georgia has two rather unique rules regarding the admissibility of
prior statements by witnesses. First, in Gibbons v. State,2 " the
supreme court held that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are
admissible as substantive evidence if the witness is subject to crossexamination.245
Second, pursuant to Cuzzort v. State,2 4 a prior
consistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence if the witness
is present at trial and is subject to cross-examination. 247 However, the
supreme court somewhat weakened Cuzzort in Woodard v. State,2 "
when it held that prior consistent statements can be admitted only when
the veracity of the witness who made the statement has been placed at
issue.2 49
The significance of the fact that prior statements can be admitted as
substantive evidence is illustrated by the court of appeals decision in
Hambrick v. State.250 In Hambrick a jury found the defendant guilty
of raping, kidnapping, and assaulting his girlfriend. Although the
girlfriend told medical personnel and counselors that the defendant had
beaten and raped her, she recanted her statements before trial. At trial,
she testified that she initiated the altercation with her boyfriend. The
prosecution then introduced evidence of the girlfriend's prior statements
implicating the defendant through the testimony of physicians and a
counselor.251
The court held that the victim's prior inconsistent
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statements were sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction.252
The Author has often noted that appellate courts seem to apply a more
liberal scope of admissible evidence in criminal cases than in civil
cases. 253 This seems to be true in cases where prior statements are
admitted pursuant to Gibbons and Cuzzort-virtually all are criminal
cases. 254 However, nothing in Gibbons, Cuzzort, or their progeny
restricts their application to criminal cases, and during the survey period
a litigant in a civil case successfully relied on Woodard to preserve a
significant judgment. In Ford Motor Co. v. Sasser,25 5 the mother of a
child severely injured as a result of an allegedly defective backseat latch
brought a products liability action against Ford, the manufacturer of the
car. The latch failed during an automobile accident, and when the seat
back collapsed forward, it caused severe spinal injuries to the plaintiff's
daughter. At trial, Ford contended that the child was not even sitting
in the front seat and relied on statements allegedly made by the plaintiff
to a law enforcement officer at the scene to prove this point. In
response, the plaintiff introduced evidence of prior statements made by
the mother that were consistent with her trial testimony that her
daughter was sitting in the front seat. 6 On appeal, Ford contended
that Woodard did not authorize the admission of these prior consistent
statements because it had not challenged the veracity of the plaintiff.257 The court of appeals agreed that a prior consistent statement
is admissible only if a witness's veracity has been placed at issue and
that this occurs "'only if affirmative charges of recent fabrication,
improper influence, or improper motive are raised during crossexamination.' 25
Unfortunately for Ford, however, the record clearly
demonstrated that Ford's counsel had repeatedly accused the plaintiff of,
for example, switching her story.2 9 Accordingly, the court of appeals
held that the trial court properly admitted evidence of the plaintiff's
prior consistent statements.
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Business Records

The business records exception to the hearsay rule allows the
admission of certain business records even though those records contain
hearsay statements.26 1 However, the business records exception does
not open the door to all business records. In Bailey v. Edmundson,2 62
the appellant contended that the trial court improperly excluded
business records summarizing statements allegedly made by appellee.263 The appellant further contended that the summaries of appellee's telephone messages were admissible either as admissions of a party
opponent or as the business records of the doctor's office whose
employees summarized the conversations.2 64
The supreme court
disagreed.2 65 With regard to the business records exception, the court
noted that the exception is intended to apply to routine facts whose
266
accuracy has likely not been affected by bias, judgment, or memory.
The court further held that the business records exception does not
encompass an employee's version of statements allegedly made in a
telephone conversation by another party.2 6' Thus, the employee's
versions of the appellee's telephone messages were hearsay and were not
admissible
pursuant to the business records exception of the hearsay
268
rule.
E.

Admissions by a Party Opponent

Since 1989 the Author has chronicled the struggle in the Georgia
appellate courts over the admissibility of statements by an employee of
an opposite party.2 69 The 1989 survey discussed the court of appeals
decision in Johnston v. Grand Union Co.,
which held that "an
admission against interest by an employee-agent is admissible . . . but
only so long as it is not hearsay."" 1 The meaning of that statement
was unclear in 1989, and it is unclear now. An admission is either
hearsay but admissible pursuant to an exception to the rule against
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hearsay, or as provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2 it is not
hearsay, and thus the rule against hearsay is inapplicable. What is
clear is that Georgia courts hold an abiding mistrust of admissions by
employees of an opposite party, and this mistrust was again evident
during the current survey period.
In Wynn v. City of Warner Robins,7 3 the plaintiff contended that the
trial court improperly excluded a report prepared by defendant's
employee. The trial court ruled that the report, although prepared by
an employee, was inadmissible hearsay. 274 On appeal, the plaintiff
contended that the report should have been admissible as an admission
by an agent of an opposite party,2 75 relying specifically on O.C.G.A.
section 24-3-33,276 which provides that "[a]dmissions by an agent
during the existence and in pursuance of his agency, shall be admissible
against the principal." 277 The plaintiff also relied on O.C.G.A. section
10-6-64,278 which provides that an agent is competent to testify against
his principal. 271 O.C.G.A. section 10-6-64, however, goes on to provide
that the "declarations of the agent as to the business transacted by him
shall not be admissible against his principal unless they were a part of
28
...the res gestae, or else the agent is dead." 1
This latter section, the court held, limits the admissibility of admissions by an employee to those made as part of the res gestae.28 '
Moreover, it cannot be admissible as an admission against interest if the
employee is not a party to the litigation.28 2 Turning to the facts of
Wynn, the court concluded that the report was not a part of the res
gestae.28 3 The court further resolved that even if it was part of the res
gestae, the report would be inadmissible as an admission against
interest because the employee was not a party to the litigation. 4
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